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Abstract
In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), dynamic spectrum access has been proposed to improve the
spectrum utilization, but it also generates spectrum misuse problems. One common solution to these
problems is to deploy monitors to detect misbehaviors on certain channel. However, in multi-channel
CRNs, it is very costly to deploy monitors on every channel. With a limited number of monitors, we
have to decide which channels to monitor. In addition, we need to determine how long to monitor
each channel and in which order to monitor, because switching channels incurs costs. Moreover, the
information about the misuse behavior is not available a priori. To answer those questions, we model the
spectrum monitoring problem as an adversarial multi-armed bandit problem with switching costs (MAB-
SC), propose an effective framework, and design two online algorithms, SpecWatch-II and SpecWatch-III,
based on the same framework. To evaluate the algorithms, we use weak regret, i.e., the performance
difference between the solution of our algorithm and optimal (fixed) solution in hindsight, as the metric.
We prove that the expected weak regret of SpecWatch-II is O(T2/3), where T is the time horizon.
Whereas, the actual weak regret of SpecWatch-III is O(T2/3) with probability 1 − δ, for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Both algorithms guarantee the upper bounds matching the lower bound of the general adversarial MAB-
SC problem. Therefore, they are all asymptotically optimal.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of wireless devices and applications, demand for access to spectrum
has been growing dramatically and is likely to continue to grow in the foreseeable future [1].
However, there is a paradoxical phenomenon that usable radio frequencies are exhausted while
much of the licensed spectrum lies idle at any given time and location [2]. To improve the
radio spectrum utilization efficiency, dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in cognitive radio net-
works (CRNs) has been proposed as a promising approach. Among various DSA strategies,
opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) based on the hierarchical access model has received much
attention recently [3–10]. This underlay approach achieves spectrum sharing by allowing sec-
ondary (unlicensed) users (SUs) to dynamically search and access the spectrum vacancy while
limiting the interference perceived by primary (licensed) users (PUs) [11].
OSA helps to improve the spectrum utilization but also results in spectrum misuse or abuse
problems due to the flexibility of spectrum opportunity. For example, an SU may intentionally
disobey the interference constraints set by the PU; or some greedy SUs may transmit more
aggressively in time and frequency to dominate the spectrum sharing, or even emulate the PU
to prevent other SUs from sharing. Through such spectrum access misbehavior, the malicious
users (MUs), i.e., the misbehaving SUs, not only harm the spectrum access operations of normal
users, but also impede the CRNs to function correctly since there is no incentive to pay for
spectrum access [12]. Thus, spectrum monitoring is necessary and imperative.
To address the spectrum misuse problem, different trusted infrastructures have been proposed to
detect spectrum misuse and punish MUs [12–15]. In addition, various detection techniques have
been designed, including enforcing silence slots [16], publicizing back-off sequences [17, 18],
exploiting spatial pattern of signal strength [19], measuring detector value [20]. There is also a
crowdsourcing-based framework named SpecGuard [21] which explores dynamic power control
at SUs to contain the spectrum permit in physical layer signals. Another crowdsourced enforce-
ment framework [22] improves the probability of detection while reducing the likelihood of false
positives for spectrum misuses and it can detect misuses caused by mobile users. Moreover,
applying big data analysis and machine learning to cloud-based radio access networks also
provide an appropriate approach to enable long-term spectrum monitoring [23].
However, all these works assume that all channels can be monitored at the same time. In
this paper, we consider spectrum monitoring in multi-channel CRNs with limited monitoring
3resource. In particular, we deploy one monitor with multiple radios where each radio is in
charge of one channel. The main problem is the selection of channels since monitoring all
channels simultaneously is very energy-consuming and impractical. It is challenging because
the information of MUs is unknown a priori. In addition, switching costs caused by changing
channels must be considered. To solve this problem, we formulate it as an adversarial (non-
stochastic) multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [24] with switching costs. We then propose an
effective spectrum monitoring framework and design two online algorithms based on it.
In summary, we contribute in the following aspects:
1) We study the adversarial spectrum monitoring problem with unknown statistics in multi-
channel CRNs, while considering the switching cost. We model this problem as an adver-
sarial MAB-SC problem.
2) We propose an online spectrum monitoring framework, SpecWatch. Based on this frame-
work, we design two spectrum monitoring algorithms, SpecWatch-II and SpecWatch-III,
which differ in the way of calculating strategy probabilities and updating strategy weights.
Our algorithms guarantee the proved performance under any type of adversary settings.
In addition, they can work with any spectrum misuse detection techniques in the current
literature.
3) We prove that the expected weak regret of SpecWatch-II is O(T2/3), which matches the
lower bound in [25]. Therefore, SpecWatch-II is asymptotically optimal. Note that the
expected value of normalized weak regret is guaranteed to be O(1/T1/3), which converges
to 0 as time horizon T approaches to ∞.
4) SpecWatch-III select channels more strategically and explore all channels more efficiently.
We prove that this algorithm guarantees the actual weak regret to be O(T2/3), which is
asymptotically optimal as well, with probability 1 − δ, for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
II. RELATED WORK
A. Spectrum Monitoring Problem
Spectrum monitoring problem has been formulated as optimization problems with different
objectives. In [26], Shin and Bagchi modeled the channel assignment for monitoring wireless
mesh networks as a maximum-coverage problem with group budget constraints. They then
extended it to the model where monitors may make errors due to poor reception [27]. Along
the same line, Nguyen et al. [28] focus on the weighted version of the problem, where users to
4be covered have weights. To maximize the captured data of interest, Chen et al. [29] utilized
support vector regression to guide monitors to intelligently select channels. Considering similar
objectives, Shin et al. [30] designed a cost-effective distributed algorithm. With a different
approach, Yan et al. [31] solved the problem by predicting secondary users’ access patterns.
However, we consider a different objective in this paper, which is to capture spectrum misuses.
In addition, we assume no information about the malicious users.
The closest works to ours were presented in [32–36]. In [32], Arora and Szepesvari first
modeled the spectrum monitoring problem as a multi-armed bandit problem (MAB) to monitor
the maximum number of active users. They designed two algorithms to learn sequentially the
user activities while making channel assignment decisions. Observing the above algorithms suffer
from high computation cost, Zheng et al. [33] traded off between the rate of learning and the
computation cost. They proposed a centralized online approximation algorithm and show that
it incurs sub-linear regret bounds over time and a distributed algorithm with moderate message
complexity. In [34], Le et al. considered switching costs for the first time and utilized Upper
Confident Bound-based (UCB) policy [37] which enjoys a logarithmic regret bound in time that
depends sublinearly on the number of arms, while its total switching cost grows in the order of
O(log(logT)). Considering a different objective, Yi et al. [35] used UCB to capture as much as
interested user data.
However, these works used the stochastic MAB model, where the rewards for playing each
arm are generated independently from unknown but fixed distributions. Our model, in contrast,
does not make such assumptions. The only work considered the similar problem model to ours
is [36], where Xu et al. tried to capture packets of target SUs for CRN forensics. However,
they did not provide any algorithm whose actual weak regret can be bounded with a confidence
value.
B. Multi-arm Bandit Problem
The MAB problem first introduced by Robbins [38] has been extensively studied in the
literature. The classical MAB problem models the trade-offs faced by a gambler who aims
to maximize his rewards over many turns by exploring different arms of slot machines and to
exploit arms which have provided him more rewards than others. The gambler has no knowledge
about the reward of each arm a priori and only gains knowledge of the arms he has pulled. An
5MAB algorithm should specify a strategy by which the gambler chooses an arm at each turn.
The performance of an algorithm is measured in regret, as will be elaborated in Section III.
There are mainly two algorithm families based on different formulations of MAB. The upper
confidence bounds (UCB) family of algorithms [39] works for stochastic MAB, whose regret can
be as small as O(lnT) where T is the number of turns. However, these algorithms are established
with the assumption that there exist fixed (though unknown) probability distributions of different
arms to generate rewards, which may not be satisfied in our spectrum monitoring problem and
thus not considered by us. The other algorithm family is the EXP3 family [24] for adversarial
MAB. Auer [24] has studied MAB with no assumption on the rewards distribution and proposed
algorithms with regret of O(T1/2). There are also some algorithms considering both stochastic
and adversarial adversary [40, 41].
However, switching costs are not considered in all above works. In our model, each time the
monitor changes its monitoring channels, there are drastic costs in terms of delay, packet loss, and
protocol overhead [42]. These costs must be taken into consideration when designing monitoring
algorithms. Although there exists some work on stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with
switching cost (MAB-SC) [42], little research has been done on adversarial MAB-SC. Dekel
et al. [25] proved the lower bound of the regret for adversarial MAB-SC to be Ω˜ (T2/3). In
this paper, the upper bound of regret guaranteed by our algorithms matches this lower bound.
Moreover, different from existing works, the strategy for each turn (or timeslot as in our model)
is no longer a single arm because we consider a more general case where multiple channels can
be monitored at the same time. Therefore, none of above algorithms can be directly applied to
our problem.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a cognitive radio network which adopts a hierarchical access structure with
primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). We assume the spectrum is divided into a set
K = {1, 2, . . . , k, . . . ,K} of K channels. The total time period is discretized into a set T =
{1, 2, . . . , t, . . . ,T} of T timeslots. Ideally, SUs seek spectrum opportunities among K channels
in a non-intrusive manner. However, the malicious users (MUs) may perform unauthorized access
or selfish access. We consider the scenario where there exists one monitor with l radios and a
setM = {1, 2, . . . ,m, . . . ,M} of M MUs. Note that for the case of multiple monitors, if there is
a central controller, it is equivalent to one monitor with the same number of radios; otherwise,
6each monitor can execute our algorithms independently. In the latter case, however, the regret
may not be bounded.
Since the monitor is equipped with l radios, it can monitor up to l channels at the same time.
Assume that one radio is tuned to monitor channel k, and there are Mk MUs on that channel, then
the detection probability of that radio to successfully detect MUs’ presence is pd(Mk), which
is dependent on the monitor’s hardware and the detection technique. Any technique in [16–20]
can be adopted to detect spectrum misuses. In practice, the detection probability will also be
dependent on the presence of PU and other SUs. However, since our algorithms do not require
the knowledge of the detection probability, we simplify the notion to pd(Mk) where it seems
that only Mk matters.
Let {0, 1, . . . , l}K denote the strategy space of the monitor. A strategy s is represented as
(as1, as2, . . . , asK), where the value of the ask is 1 if a radio is assigned to monitor channel k,
0 otherwise. Therefore,
∑
k∈K ask = l. For example, considering 4 channels and a monitor with
2 radios, strategy (0, 1, 0, 1) indicates that one radio is tuned to monitor channel 2 and the other
radio is tuned to monitor channel 4. For notational simplicity, we will write k ∈ s instead of
ask = 1 to denote that channel k is chosen in strategy s. Since each radio is assigned one out
of K channels to monitor, and we have l radios in total, the number of strategies is S =
(k
l
)
.
The whole strategy set is represented as S = {1, 2, . . . , s, . . . , S}. Note that K and l are usually
small. For example, the regulated 2.4 GHz band is divided into only 14 channels. The maximum
number of radios on each monitor defined by the active IEEE 802.11af standard is set to be
4 [43].
In this paper, we assume both the monitor and MUs are static, i.e., staying at the same location.
Note that when mobility is considered as in the pursuit-evasion problems [44], we only need to
enlarge the strategy space by including the location dimension.
At the beginning of timeslot t ∈ T , the monitor selects only one strategy from the strategy set
S, and we denote the chosen strategy as Xt . We assume the switching cost c(Xt−1, Xt) ∈ [0, 1],
but our algorithm can be generalized to any range
[
c, c¯
]
, c < c¯ by scaling, where c and c¯ are
the minimum value and the maximum value of the switching cost, respectively. For simplicity,
set the switching cost of the first timeslot to be c(X0, X1) = c0 regardless of what X1 is. Clearly,
c(Xt−1, Xt) = 0 if Xt−1 = Xt .
Threat Model: At each timeslot t ∈ T , each MU m ∈ M chooses one channel to attack (conduct
misuses) according to its attack probability distribution Pmt =
{
Pmt,1, . . . , P
m
t,K
}
where Pmt,k denotes
7the probability of MU m attacking channel k in timeslot t. Since MUs may not attack in some
timeslot,
∑
k∈K Pmt,k ≤ 1 for any m ∈ M and t ∈ T . We consider two types of adversary:
1) Oblivious Adversary (Stochastic): The MUs keep their attack patterns regardless of how
the monitor work. For any MU m, the attack distribution Pmt remains the same throughout
the time horizon. In this paper, we consider three different adversary settings (elaborated
in Section VII): fixed adversary, uniform adversary, and normal adversary.
2) Adaptive Adversary (Adversarial): The MUs know every action of the monitor from the
beginning to the current timeslot and adjust their strategies accordingly based on any
learning algorithms, i.e., the attack distribution might change with time.
Our framework and algorithms work for both types and the theoretical bounds hold no matter
what the adversary type is.
Now we define the reward for the monitor. The strategy reward of choosing strategy s in
timeslot t is
gs,t
def
=

∑
k∈s fk,t if s = Xt,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where the channel reward fk,t is defined as
fk,t
def
=

r if channel k ∈ Xt and misuse is detected,
0 otherwise,
(2)
where the unit reward r is assumed to be scaled and satisfies rl ≤ 1 for the purpose of
mathematical analysis. Note that the probability of at least one MU being detected on monitored
channel k is determined by the number of radios on that channel Mk , the detection probability
pd(Mk) and the action of MUs {Pmt,k}Mm=1. We denote the detection probability on channel k by
adopting strategy Xt at timeslot t as Pd
(
aXt k, pd(Mk), {Pmt,k}Mm=1
)
which is assumed to be a non-
decreasing function in aXt k , pd(Mk), and Pmt,k . Thus, the channel reward fk,t is r with probability
Pd
(
aXt k, pd(Mk), {Pmt,k}Mm=1
)
. Note that the knowledge of this probability is not required.
Assume the monitor follows the strategy sequence X1, X2, . . . , XT generated by any monitoring
Algorithm A. At the end of timeslot T , the cumulative strategy reward is
GA
def
=
T∑
t=1
gXt,t . (3)
Meanwhile, the monitor incurs cumulative switching cost
LA
def
=
T∑
t=1
c(Xt−1, Xt). (4)
8Thus, the utility of the monitor by choosing Algorithm A is
UA = GA − LA. (5)
To measure the performance of Algorithm A, we use a special case of the worst-case regret,
weak regret [24], as the metric.
The weak regret of Algorithm A is the difference between the utility by using best fixed
algorithm and the actual utility by using Algorithm A. A fixed algorithm chooses only one
strategy for all timeslots and never switches. The best fixed algorithm is the one resulting in the
highest utility among all fixed algorithms. The strategy chosen in best fixed algorithm is called
the best strategy, denoted by sbest . Formally, sbest
def
= argmaxs∈S
(∑T
t=1 gs,t − c0
)
, and the utility
by using the best fixed algorithm is
Ubest
def
= Gbest − Lbest, (6)
where Gbest = maxs∈S
∑T
t=1 gs,t and Lbest = c0 since the switch only happens at the first timeslot.
Note that the best strategy can only be found in hindsight.
Now we can define the weak regret of Algorithm A as
RA
def
= Ubest −UA. (7)
Problem Statement: Given K channels, time horizon T , and a monitor with l radios, our
objective is to design online spectrum monitoring algorithms such that the weak regret is
minimized, in the presence of different adversaries. We make no assumption on the knowledge
of the probability functions pd(Mk) and Pd
(
aXt k, pd(Mk), {Pmt,k}Mm=1
)
. In addition, the attack
distribution Pmt and the reward of choosing a strategy are unknown a priori.
Therefore, any desired algorithm needs to balance not only the trade-off between exploration
and exploitation, but also that between strategy rewards and switching costs. This is a very
challenging problem.
IV. SPECTRUM MONITORING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we design SpecWatch, a spectrum monitoring framework, based on the batching
version of exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation, where the idea of
batching is inspired by [45].
To control the trade-off between the reward and the switching cost, we group all the timeslots
into consecutive and disjoint batches. Within each batch, we stick to the same strategy to avoid
9the switching cost. Between batches, we reselect a strategy to gain higher rewards. A smaller
batch size may result in larger reward but larger switching cost, while a bigger batch size may
result in smaller switching cost but smaller reward.
SpecWatch:
1 Parameter: τ ∈ [1,T]
2 Initialization: ws,1 ← 1 for all s ∈ S, J ← dT/τe.
3 for j ← 1, . . . , J do
4 Calculate the strategy probability ps, j for all s ∈ S
5 Choose strategy Z j ∈ S randomly accordingly to the probability distribution
p1, j, . . . , pS, j and incur switching cost c(Z j−1, Z j).
6 Monitor using Z j for τ timeslots, i.e., X[ j]+i ← Z j for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ, and record the reward
of each monitored channel, fk,[ j]+i for all k ∈ Z j , 1 ≤ i ≤ τ.
7 Update strategy weight ws, j+1 for all s ∈ S.
8 end
The design details of SpecWatch are illustrated above. We first set the initial weight of each
strategy to be 1. Given the batch size τ, the timeslots 1, 2, . . . ,T are divided into J = dT/τe
consecutive and disjoint batches. Let [ j] = ( j−1)τ for 1 ≤ j ≤ J. Then the j-th batch starts from
timeslot [ j]+ 1 and ends at timeslot [ j]+ τ as shown in Fig. 1. At the beginning of each batch,
we calculate the strategy probabilities according to strategy weights. Then we randomly select
a strategy based on the probability distribution. During the whole batch, the chosen strategy
remains the same. At the end of each batch, strategy weights are updated according to the
strategy rewards.
Fig. 1: Example of batching timeslots with batch size τ = 4
In the following sections, we design two effective online spectrum monitoring algorithms,
SpecWatch-II and SpecWatch-III. These two algorithms are designed based on SpecWatch and
10
TABLE I: MAIN NOTATIONS
Notation Meaning
K set of all channels
T set of all timeslots
M set of malicious users
S set of all strategies
C covering strategy set
Ck number of strategies in C that contains channel k
l number of radios in the monitor
r unit channel reward which satisfies rl ≤ 1
c(Xt−1, Xt ) switching cost from strategy Xt−1 to Xt
GA cumulative strategy rewards of Algorithm A
LA cumulative switching costs of Algorithm A
UA utility of Algorithm A
RA weak regret of Algorithm A
τ parameter to determine the batch size
J number of batches
γ parameter to calculate strategy probabilities
η parameter to update weights
β parameter to calculate channel scores
fk,t channel reward of channel k in timeslot t
gs,t strategy reward of strategy s in timeslot t
f¯k, j average channel reward of channel k in batch j
g¯s, j average strategy reward of strategy s in batch j
f¯′
k, j
average channel score of channel k in batch j
g¯′s, j average strategy score of strategy s in batch j
hk, j channel weight of channel k in batch j
ws, j strategy weight of strategy s in batch j
Wj total weight of all strategies in batch j
qk, j channel probability of channel k in batch j
ps, j strategy probability of strategy s in batch j
SpecWatch+ in our paper [46]. We rename SpecWatch and SpecWatch+ to SpecWatch-I and
SpecWatch-III, respectively. We introduce SpecWatch-II in this paper and discard SpecWatch-I
because SpecWatch-II has better theoretical performance than SpecWatch-I.
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The main notations are summarized in Table I.
Different algorithms use different equations to calculate the strategy probabilities (Line 3)
and update the strategy weights (Line 6). With carefully chosen parameters, their theoretical
performances are shown in Table II. In summary, SpecWatch-I and SpecWatch-II bound the
expected weak regrets to O(T2/3); while SpecWatch-III bounds the actual weak regret to O(T2/3)
with user-defined probability.
TABLE II: ALGORITHM COMPARISON
Algorithm Core Functions Theoretical Bound of Weak Regret
SpecWatch-I
ps, j = (1 − γ)ws, jW j +
γ
S
IE [RI] ≤ 3 ((e − 1)S ln S)
1
3 T
2
3
ws, j+1 = ws, j exp
(
γ
S
∑
k∈s
1
τ
∑τ
i=1 fk,[ j]+i∑
s:k∈s ps, j
)
SpecWatch-II
ps, j =
ws, j
W j
IE [RII] ≤ 3
(
1
2 S ln S
) 1
3 T
2
3
ws, j+1 = ws, j exp
(
−η∑k∈s 1k∈Zj (1/l− 1τ ∑τi=1 fk,[ j]+i )∑
s:k∈s ps, j
)
SpecWatch-III
ps, j = (1 − γ)ws, jW j +
γ
C1s∈C
IPr
[
RIII ≤ 2
(
4
√
lC ln S + 2
√
lK ln Kδ
) 2
3
T
2
3
]
≤ 1 − δ
ws, j+1 = ws, j exp
©­«η∑k∈s
1
τ
∑τ
i=1 fk,[ j]+i+β
(1−γ)
∑
s:k∈s ws, j
W j
+
γCk
C
ª®¬
V. SPECTRUM MONITORING ALGORITHM WITH BOUNDED EXPECTED WEAK REGRET
In this section, we design one spectrum monitoring algorithm, SpecWatch-II, whose expected
weak regret is theoretically bounded.
A. SpecWatch-II
1) Algorithm Design: Compared to SpecWatch-I, the input parameters of SpecWatch-II are τ
and η, where τ determines the batch size and η is used to calculate strategy weights; the strategy
probabilities in SpecWatch-II are proportion to the strategy weights only, and the strategy weights
are updated smaller for the next timeslot.
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Calculating Strategy Probability ps, j . The probability of choosing strategy s ∈ S is calculated
using
ps, j =
ws, j
W j
, (8)
where ws, j is the strategy weight of strategy s in batch j, and W j =
∑
s∈S ws, j . Recall that in
SpecWatch-I, we use the weighted average of two terms, ps, j = (1− γ)ws, jWj +
γ
S, where the first is
to exploit strategies with good reward history, and the second guarantees the exploration over all
strategies. γ controls the balance between them. Now we only have one term, but the balance
still exists. This is because a strategy not chosen before is guaranteed to have a higher weight,
due to the way we update the strategy weight as discussed below.
Choosing Strategy Z j and Monitoring Spectrum. We select a strategy Z j ∈ S randomly
according to the probabilities calculated above. The monitor keeps using Z j for all τ timeslots
in batch j, i.e., X[ j]+i = Z j for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ. Therefore, the monitor only incurs switching cost
c(Z j−1, Z j) once for the whole batch j.
Depending on the misuse behavior of MUs (discussed in Section III), the monitor receives
rewards on monitored channels accordingly. The monitor keeps records of fk,[ j]+i for all k ∈ Z j
and 1 ≤ i ≤ τ. The strategy reward gained by the monitor is the summation of rewards over all
monitored channels.
Updating Strategy Weight ws, j+1. At the end of each batch, we update strategy weights in
the following steps.
First, we calculate the average channel reward of each channel k ∈ K in batch j,
f¯k, j =
1
τ
τ∑
i=1
fk,[ j]+i . (9)
By (2), f¯k, j ∈ [0, r]. We also calculate the probability of choosing channel k ∈ Z j by summing
up the probabilities of strategies containing that channel,
qk, j =
∑
s:k∈s
ps, j . (10)
where s : k ∈ s denotes any strategy s containing channel k. Based on (9) and (10), we calculate
the average channel score,
f¯′k, j =
1/l − f¯k, j
qk, j
1k∈Z j, (11)
where 1k∈Z j is an indicator function which has the value 1 if k ∈ Z j ; 0 otherwise. This score is
always nonnegative since f¯k, j ≤ r ≤ 1/l. Then we update each channel weight by
hk, j+1 = hk, j exp
(
−ηf¯′k, j
)
, (12)
13
where hk,1 = 1 for all k ∈ K. Note that the channel weight is non-increasing from batch to
batch.
Finally, we give the formal definition of strategy weight, which is defined as
ws, j
def
=
∏
k∈s
hk, j . (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we can directly update the strategy weight for each s ∈ S by
ws, j+1 = ws, j exp(−ηg¯′s, j), (14)
where g¯′s, j is the average strategy score for each s ∈ S, i.e.,
g¯′s, j =
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j . (15)
Note that by combining (9), (10) and (11), we can directly calculate g¯′s, j directly by
g¯′s, j =
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j =
∑
k∈s
1k∈Z j (1/l − f¯k, j)
qk, j
=
∑
k∈s
1k∈Z j (1/l − 1τ
∑τ
i=1 fk,[ j]+i)∑
s:k∈s ps, j
. (16)
Remark. We do not update strategy weights based on strategy rewards, but instead calculate
channel weights (12) first. This is because the rewards of monitored channels provide useful
information on those unchosen strategies containing these channels.
2) Performance Analysis: To analyze the performance of SpecWatch-II, we first bound the
difference between the reward gained by SpecWatch-II and that by the best fixed algorithm
(Lemma 1), and then prove the upper bound of the expected weak regret (Theorem 1). For a
better understanding of Theorem 1, we present a specific bound obtained by a particular choice
of parameters η and τ (Corollary 1).
Recalling (5), (6) and (7), the weak regret of SpecWatch-II is
RII = (Gbest − Lbest) − (GII − LII). (17)
Since the best fixed algorithm never switches the strategies, and SpecWatch-II only switches
between batches for at most J times, their cumulative switching costs are
Lbest = c0 ∈ [0, 1] and LII =
J∑
j=1
c(Z j−1, Z j) ≤ J .
Thus, we have
LII − Lbest ≤ J . (18)
Now it suffices to only consider the difference between rewards. An important observation is
that we group the timeslots into batches, calculate the strategy probabilities only at the beginning
14
of each batch, and use the average value of entire batch to update weight. Therefore, each batch
can be considered as a round in conventional MAB. With this consideration, we introduce the
notations below for our proofs,
g¯s, j =
∑
k∈s
f¯k, j, G¯II
def
=
J∑
j=1
g¯Z j, j and G¯best
def
= max
s∈S
J∑
j=1
g¯s, j . (19)
Note that
g¯s, j =
∑
k∈s
f¯k, j =
1
τ
∑
k∈s
fk, j =
1
τ
∑
k∈s
τ∑
i=1
fk,[ j]+r
=
1
τ
τ∑
i=1
∑
k∈s
fk,[ j]+r =
1
τ
τ∑
i=1
gs,[ j]+r .
Thus we have
GII =
T∑
t=1
gXt,t = τ
J∑
j=1
g¯s, j = τG¯II. (20)
Similarly,
Gbest = τG¯best . (21)
We now provide the bound of the expected difference between G¯II and G¯best .
Lemma 1. For any type of adversaries, any T > 0, and any η > 0, we have
IE
[
G¯best − G¯II
] ≤ ηJS
2
+
ln S
η
, (22)
where ln is the natural logarithm function.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on [40, Theorem 3.1] with necessary modifications and
extensions.
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First we analyze Wj+1Wj . For any sequences Z1, . . . , Z j generated by SpecWatch-II, we have
W j+1
W j
=
∑
s∈S
ws, j+1
W j
=
∑
s∈S
ws, j
W j
exp
(
−ηg¯′s, j
)
=
∑
s∈S
ps, j exp
(
−ηg¯′s, j
)
(23)
≤
∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
1 − ηg¯′s, j +
1
2
(
ηg¯′s, j
)2)
(24)
≤ 1 − η
∑
s∈S
(
ps, j g¯′s, j
)
+
η2
2
∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2
, (25)
where (23) uses the definition of ps, j , and (24) holds by the fact that for x ≥ 0, e−x ≤ 1− x+ 12 x2.
Next, we bound (25) by bounding
∑
s∈S ps, j g¯′s, j and
∑
s∈S ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2
.∑
s∈S
ps, j g¯′s, j =
∑
s∈S
(
ps, j
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, j
∑
s:k∈s
ps, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, jqk, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
1/l − f¯k, j
)
=
∑
k∈Z j
(
1/l − f¯k, j
)
+
∑
k∈K\Z j
(
1/l − f¯k, j
)
≥ 1 − g¯Z j, j, (26)
∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2
=
∑
s∈S
©­«ps, j
(∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j
)2ª®¬
≤
∑
s∈S
(
ps, j · l ·
∑
k∈s
(
f¯′k, j
)2)
(27)
= l ·
∑
k∈K
((
f¯′k, j
)2 ∑
s:k∈s
ps, j
)
= l ·
∑
k∈K
((
f¯′k, j
)2
qk, j
)
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= l ·
∑
k∈K
©­­«f¯′k, j ·
(
1/l − f¯k, j
)
qk, j
· qk, j
ª®®¬
≤ l ·
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, j ·
1
f
)
=
∑
k∈K
f¯′k, j
=
∑
k∈Z j
f¯′k, j +
∑
k∈K\Z j
f¯′k, j
= g¯′Z j, j,
where (27) holds as a special case of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
Thus, we have ∑
s∈S
ps, j g¯′s, j ≥ g¯Z j, j and
∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2 ≤ g¯′Z j, j . (28)
Combining (25) and (28), we have
W j+1
W j
≤ 1 − η(1 − g¯Z j, j) +
η2
2
g¯′Z j, j . (29)
Taking the log of both sides and using 1 + x ≤ ex gives
ln
W j+1
W j
≤ −η(1 − g¯Z j, j) +
η2
2
g¯′Z j, j . (30)
Summing over j, we then get
ln
WJ+1
W1
≤ −η(J − G¯II) + η
2
2
J∑
j=1
g¯′Z j, j . (31)
Now we consider the lower bound of ln WJ+1W1 . For any strategy s,
ln
WJ+1
W1
≥ ln ws, j+1
W1
= ln
ws,1 exp
(
−η∑Jj=1 g¯′s, j )
Iws,1
= −η
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j − ln S.
Since the above inequality holds for any strategy s, we get
ln
WJ+1
W1
≥ −ηmin
s∈S
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j − ln S. (32)
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Combining (31) and (32), we have
−η(J − G¯II) + η
2
2
J∑
j=1
g¯′Z j, j ≥ −ηmins∈S
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j − ln S.
Dividing both sides by −η and moving terms, we have
(J − G¯II) −min
s∈S
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j ≤
η
2
J∑
j=1
g¯′Z j, j +
ln S
η
. (33)
We take expectations of both sides in (33) with respect to the distribution of Z1, Z2, . . . , Z j .
For the conditional expected value of each g¯′s, j , we have
IE
[
g¯′s, j |Z1, Z2, . . . , Z j−1
]
= ps, j ·
1 − g¯s, j
ps, j
+ (1 − ps, j) · IE
[
g¯′s, j |s , Z j
]
= ps, j
1 − g¯s, j
ps, j
= 1 − g¯s, j,
where the first equation is due to the fact that Z j = s with probability ps, j , and the second
equation is due to that g¯′s, j =
∑
k∈s f¯′k, j = 0 when s , Z j .
Similarly,
IE
[
g¯′Z j, j |Z1, Z2, . . . , Z j−1
]
= 1 − g¯Z j, j .
Therefore, we have
IE
[
G¯best − G¯II
] ≤ η
2
J∑
j=1
g¯Z j, j +
ln S
η
≤ η
2
JS +
ln S
η
.
Now taking into consideration the bound of switching costs, (18), we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. For any type of adversaries, the expected weak regret of SpecWatch-II is O(T 23 ) with
parameters η = AηT−
1
3 > 0 and τ = AτT
1
3 ∈ [1,T] , where Aγ and Aτ are constants. Specifically,
IE [RII] ≤
(
AηS
2
+
Aτ ln S
Aη
+
1
Aτ
)
T
2
3 . (34)
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Proof.
IE [RII] = IE [Gbest − Lbest − GII + LII]
≤ IE [Gbest − GII] + J
= IE
[
τG¯best − τG¯II
]
+ J
=
ηJSτ
2
+
τ ln S
η
+ J
=
ηST
2
+
τ ln S
η
+ T/τ
=
(
AηS
2
+
Aτ ln S
Aη
+
1
Aτ
)
T
2
3 .
For better understanding of Theorem 1, we now give a specific bound by choosing particular
parameters.
Corollary 1. For any type of adversaries, when T ≥ 12S ln S, with parameters η = 3
√
4 ln S
S2T and
τ = 3
√
2T
S ln S , the expected weak regret of SpecWatch-II is
IE [RII] ≤ 3
(
1
2
S ln S
) 1
3
T
2
3 . (35)
Proof. Substituting the parameters in (34), we have the immediate result.
Remark. The expected weak regret of SpecWatch-II is bounded by O(T2/3). This upper bound
matches the lower bound of the MAB-SC problem proved in [25] which is used to model the
spectrum monitoring problem in this paper. Thus, SpecWatch-II is asymptotically optimal. If we
calculate the normalized weak regret RIIT , i.e., amortizing the regret to every timeslot, then it is
clear that the expected value of normalized weak regret converges to 0 as T approaches to ∞.
VI. SPECTRUM MONITORING ALGORITHM WITH BOUNDED WEAK REGRET
We have already proved that SpecWatch-II is an effective online spectrum monitoring algo-
rithms with expected normalized regret converging to 0. Though the expectation provides a quite
legitimate estimate on the performance of SpecWatch-I and SpecWatch-II, the actual value of
weak regret may sometimes deviate a lot from the expected bound as expectation just represents
the mean. In this section, we propose the improved algorithm, SpecWatch-III, whose actual weak
regrets are bounded by O(T2/3) with any user-defined confidence level.
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A. SpecWatch-III
1) Algorithm Design: SpecWatch-III is designed similar to SpecWatch-II. However, it takes
four parameters τ, γ, β and η as input, where γ is used to calculate strategy probabilities, β is
used to calculate average channel scores, and η is used to update strategy weights.
Calculating Strategy Probability ps, j . For calculating strategy probabilities, we introduce a
new concept called covering strategy set. A covering strategy set C ⊂ S is a set of strategy that
covers all channels K, where a channel k ∈ K is covered by C if there is a strategy s ∈ C such
that k ∈ s. In SpecWatch-III, we randomly construct a minimal covering strategy set whose size
C def= |C| is less than or equal to K . The probability of each strategy s is calculated by
ps, j = (1 − γ)
ws, j
W j
+
γ
C
1s∈C, (36)
where 1s∈C is an indicator function which has the value 1 if s ∈ C; 0 otherwise. In this way, the
strategies in the covering set are more likely to be chosen than others. As a result, SpecWatch-III
can explore all channels more quickly, and thus reveal the best channels sooner, which expedites
the exploration for the best strategy.
Choosing Strategy Z j and Monitoring Spectrum. This part is the same as SpecWatch-II.
Updating Strategy Weight ws, j+1. For calculating average channel scores, we introduce a
new parameter β and have f¯′k, j =
f¯k, j+β
qk, j
, where qk, j is the channel probability of k ∈ K in batch
j. By (36), we have is qk, j =
∑
s:k∈s ps, j = (1 − γ)
∑
s:k∈s ws, j
Wj
+
γCk
C , where Ck is the number of
strategies in the covering strategy set and containing channel k, i.e., Ck = |{s |s ∈ C ∧ k ∈ s}|.
The average channel score use qk, j as the denominator in order to compensate the rewards
of channels with low probabilities. Among the channels receiving rewards, those with lower
probabilities can obtain higher average channel scores, and therefore higher channel weights.
Note that we could also gain rewards on an unmonitored channel if we had monitored it, which
indicates that the average channel score of that channel should be positive. With this concern,
we use parameter β to reduce the bias between monitored and unmonitored channels.
Then the channel weight of k is
hk, j+1 = hk, j exp
(
ηf¯′k, j−1
)
, (37)
where hk,1 = 1 for all k ∈ K. Thus, the strategy weight of s is updated by
ws, j+1 = ws, j exp(ηg¯′s, j), (38)
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where g¯′s, j is the average strategy score of s in batch j and can be calculated directly by
g¯′s, j =
∑
k∈s
1
τ
∑τ
i=1 fk,[ j]+i + β
(1 − γ)
∑
s:k∈s ws, j
Wj
+
γCk
C
. (39)
2) Performance Analysis: Since SpecWatch-III only update the monitoring strategy across
batches, each batch can be regarded as a round in conventional MAB. We define G¯III
def
=
∑J
j=1 g¯Z j, j ,
where Z j is SpecWatch-III’s chosen strategy for each batch. Then we have the following lemma.
We first introduce the following two notations,
F¯k,n
def
=
n∑
j=1
f¯k, j and F¯′k,n
def
=
n∑
j=1
f¯′k, j for k ∈ K, (40)
where n is an arbitrary batch, f¯k, j = 1τ
∑τ
i=1 fk,[ j]+i and f¯
′
k, j =
f¯k, j+β
qk, j
.
We then prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any type of adversaries, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1) and k ∈ K in SpecWatch-III,
we have
IPr
[
F¯k,n ≥ F¯′k,n +
1
β
ln
K
δ
]
≤ δ
K
. (41)
Proof. We prove (41) based on [47, Lemma 2]. Note that f¯′k, j for different batches are generated
independently and F¯k,n is the sum of these independent random variables. By the Chernoff bound,
we have
IPr
[
F¯k,n ≥ F¯′k,n + u
] ≤ exp(−uv)IE [exp (v (F¯k,n − F¯′k,n))] ,
for any k ∈ K, any u > 0, and any v > 0. Let u = 1β ln Kδ and v = β, then we have
exp(−uv)IE
[
exp
(
v
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))]
= exp(− ln K
δ
)IE
[
exp
(
β
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))]
=
δ
K
IE
[
exp
(
β
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))]
.
Thus, to prove (41), it suffices to prove that for all n,
IE
[
exp
(
β
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))]
≤ 1.
Define
Dn
def
= exp
(
β
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))
.
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We first show that IEn [Dn] ≤ Dn−1 for n ≥ 2, where IEn denotes the conditional expectation
IE [·|Z1, Z2, . . . Zn−1]. Note that
Dn = Dn−1 exp
(
β
(
f¯k,n − f¯′k,n
))
.
Taking conditional expectations, we obtain
IEn [Dn]
= Dn−1IEn
[
exp
(
β
(
f¯k,n − f¯′k,n
))]
= Dn−1IEn
[
exp
(
β
(
f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,n + βqk,n
))]
= Dn−1 exp
(
− β
2
qk,n
)
IEn
[
exp
(
β
(
f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,nqk,n
))]
≤ Dn−1 exp
(
− β
2
qk,n
)
IEn
[
1 + β
(
f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,nqk,n
)
+β2
(
f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,nqk,n
)2 (42)
= Dn−1 exp
(
− β
2
qk,n
)
IEn
1 + β2
(
f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,nqk,n
)2 (43)
≤ Dn−1 exp
(
− β
2
qk,n
)
IEn
1 + β2
(
1k∈Zn f¯k,n
qk,n
)2
≤ Dn−1 exp
(
− β
2
qk,n
) (
1 +
β2
qk,n
)
≤ Dn−1, (44)
where 1k∈Zn = 1 if k ∈ Zn and 0 otherwise; (42) holds because β < 1, f¯k,n − 1k∈Zn f¯k,nqk,n ≤ 1 and
ex ≤ 1 + x + x2 for x ≤ 1; (43) follows from IEt
[
1k∈Zn f¯k,n
qk,n
]
= f¯k,n; (44) holds by the inequality
1 + x ≤ ex . Taking expectations on both sides proves
IE [Dn] ≤ IE [Dn−1] .
A similar approach shows that IE [D1] ≤ 1, which implies IE [Dn] = IE
[
exp
(
β
(
F¯k,n − F¯′k,n
))]
≤ 1
as desired.
22
Lemma 3. For any type of adversaries, any T > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1/2), τ ∈ [1,T], β ∈ (0, 1), and η > 0
satisfying 2ηlC ≤ γ, we have
G¯best − G¯III ≤ γJ + 2ηlCJ + l
β
ln
K
δ
+
ln S
η
+ βKJ .
with probability at least 1 − δ for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. First, we show 0 ≤ ηg¯s, j ≤ 1. It is easy to notice that ηg¯′s, j ≥ 0. In addition, we have
ηg¯′s, j = η
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j ≤ η
∑
k∈s
f¯k, j + β
q¯s, j
≤ η
∑
k∈s
1 + β
γ
C
≤ (1 + β)ηlC
γ
≤ 1,
where the second inequality is due to qk, j ≥ γC for all k ∈ K, and the last inequality is due to
2ηlC ≤ γ.
Then we analyze Wj+1Wj . For any sequence Z1, . . . , Z j generated by SpecWatch-III, we have
W j+1
W j
=
∑
s∈S
ws, j+1
W j
=
∑
s∈S
ws, j
W j
exp
(
ηg¯′s, j
)
=
∑
s∈S
ps, j − γC1s∈C
1 − γ exp
(
ηg¯′s, j
)
(45)
≤
∑
s∈S
ps, j − γC1s∈C
1 − γ
(
1 + ηg¯′s, j + η
2
(
g¯′s, j
)2)
(46)
≤ 1 − γ
1 − γ +
∑
s∈S
ps, j
1 − γ
(
ηg¯′s, j + η
2
(
g¯′s, j
)2)
≤ 1 + η
1 − γ
∑
s∈S
ps, j g¯′s, j +
η2
1 − γ
∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2
, (47)
where (45) uses the definition of ps, j in (36), and (46) holds by the fact that ex ≤ 1+ x + x2 for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
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Next we bound (47). For the second term, we have∑
s∈S
ps, j g¯′s, j =
∑
s∈S
(
ps, j
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, j
∑
s:k∈s
ps, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, jqk, j
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
f¯k, j + β
)
=
∑
k∈Z j
(
f¯k, j + β
)
+
∑
k∈K\Z j
(
f¯k, j + β
)
= g¯Z j, j + Kβ, (48)
where (48) uses the definition of average strategy reward and the fact that f¯k, j is 0 when k < Z j .
For the second sum, ∑
s∈S
ps, j
(
g¯′s, j
)2
=
∑
s∈S
©­«ps, j
(∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j
)2ª®¬
≤
∑
s∈S
(
ps, j · l ·
∑
k∈s
(
f¯′k, j
)2)
(49)
= l ·
∑
k∈K
((
f¯′k, j
)2 ∑
s:k∈s
ps, j
)
= l ·
∑
k∈K
((
f¯′k, j
)2
qk, j
)
= l ·
∑
k∈K
(
f¯′k, j ·
1k∈Z j f¯k, j + β
qk, j
· qk, j
)
≤ l · (1 + β) ·
∑
k∈K
f¯′k, j
≤ l · (1 + β) ·
∑
s∈C
g¯′s, j, (50)
where (49) holds as a special case of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality
(∑n
i=1 ai · 1
)2 ≤ (∑ni=1 a2i ) (∑ni=1 12) ,
and (50) holds because covering strategy set C covers each channel at least once.
Therefore, combining (47), (48), and (50), we have
W j+1
W j
≤ 1 + η
1 − γ
(
g¯Z j, j + Kβ
)
+
η2l(1 + β)
1 − γ
∑
s∈C
g¯′s, j .
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Taking the log of both sides and using 1 + x ≤ ex gives
ln
W j+1
W j
≤ η
1 − γ
(
g¯Z j, j + Kβ
)
+
η2l(1 + β)
1 − γ
∑
s∈C
g¯′s, j .
Summing over j we then get
ln
WJ+1
W1
≤ η
1 − γ
(
G¯III + JKβ
)
+
η2l(1 + β)
1 − γ
J∑
j=1
∑
s∈C
g¯′s, j .
Note that
J∑
j=1
∑
s∈C
g¯′s, j ≤ C maxs∈S
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j ≤ C maxs∈S G¯
′
s,J .
We have
ln
WJ+1
W1
≤ η
1 − γ
(
G¯III + JKβ
)
+
η2l(1 + β)C
1 − γ maxs∈S G¯
′
s,J . (51)
Now we consider the lower bound of ln WJ+1W1 . For any strategy s,
ln
WJ+1
W1
≥ ln ws, j+1
W1
= ln
ws,1 exp
(
η
∑J
j=1 g¯
′
s, j
)
Sws,1
= η
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j − ln S
= ηG¯′s,J − ln S.
Since the above inequality holds for any strategy s, we get
ln
WJ+1
W1
≥ ηmax
s∈S
G¯′s,J − ln S. (52)
Combining (51) and (52), we have
G¯III ≥ (1 − γ − ηl(1 + β)C)max
s∈S
G¯′s,J −
1 − γ
η
ln S − JKβ. (53)
Note that
G¯′s,J =
J∑
j=1
g¯′s, j =
J∑
j=1
∑
k∈s
f¯′k, j =
∑
k∈s
F¯′k,n,
and that
G¯s,J =
J∑
j=1
g¯s, j =
J∑
j=1
∑
k∈s
f¯k, j =
∑
k∈s
F¯k,n.
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By using Lemma 41 and applying Boole’s inequality, we obtain that, with probability at least
1 − δ,
G¯III ≥ (1 − γ − ηl(1 + β)C)
(
max
s∈S
G¯s,J − l
β
ln
K
δ
)
− 1 − γ
η
ln S − JKβ
≥ (1 − γ − ηl(1 + β)C)
(
G¯best − l
β
ln
K
δ
)
− 1 − γ
η
ln S − JKβ,
where 1 − γ − ηl(1 + β)C > 0 because ηl(1 + β)C ≤ 2ηlC ≤ γ < 1/2.
Therefore,
G¯best − G¯III
≤ (γ + ηl(1 + β)C)G¯best
+ (1 − γ − ηl(1 + β)C) l
β
ln
K
δ
+
1 − γ
η
ln S + JKβ
≤ γJ + 2ηlCJ + l
β
ln
K
δ
+
ln S
η
+ βKJ,
where the last inequity is due to the fact that G¯best ≤ J.
Next, we bound the difference between the cumulative strategy reward of the best fixed
algorithm and that of SpecWatch-III.
Theorem 2. For any type of adversaries, with probability at least 1 − δ, the weak regret of
SpecWatch-III is bounded by O(T 23 ). In particular, choosing τ = BτT 13 ∈ [1,T] , γ = BγT− 13 ∈
(0, 12 ), β = BβT−
1
3 ∈ (0, 1), and η = Bγ2lCT−
1
3 , where Bτ, Bγ, and Bβ are constants, we have
RIII ≤
(
2Bγ + BβK + Bτ
(
l ln Kδ
Bβ
+
ln S
Bη
)
+
1
Bτ
)
T
2
3 . (54)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we have
RII = Gbest − Lbest − GII + LII
≤ Gbest − GII + J
= τG¯best − τG¯II + T
τ
≤ τ
(
γJ + 2ηlCJ +
l
β
ln
K
δ
+
ln S
η
+ βKJ
)
+
T
τ
,
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≤ (γ + 2ηlC + βK)T + τ
(
l
β
ln
K
δ
+
ln S
η
)
+
T
τ
, (55)
with probability at least 1− δ. The last inequality follows from Lemma 3. Plugging in the value
of parameters finishes the proof.
We now provide an example choice of parameters to reach a specific bound.
Corollary 2. For any type of adversaries, under the condition of
T ≥ max
B
2,
8 (lC ln S)3/2
B
,
(
l
K ln
K
δ
)3/2
B
 ,
using parameters τ = B−
2
3T
1
3 , γ =
√
lC ln S · B− 13T− 13 , β =
√
l
K ln
K
δ · B−
1
3T−
1
3 , and η =
√
ln S
4lC ·
B−
1
3T−
1
3 , where B = 4
√
lC ln S + 2
√
lK ln Kδ , we have
RIII ≤ 2
(
4
√
lC ln S + 2
√
lK ln
K
δ
) 2
3
T
2
3 , (56)
with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof. Substituting the parameters in (54), we have the immediate result.
Remark. Note that it is not guaranteed that SpecWatch-III always outperforms SpecWatch-II. The
improvement over SpecWatch-II is the fact that SpecWatch-III guarantees the actual weak regret
to be bounded with any predefined confidence level.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We conduct extensive simulations to demonstrate the performance of our proposed online
spectrum monitoring algorithms, SpecWatch-I, SpecWatch-II, and SpecWatch-III. We first show
the convergence of normalized weak regrets of all four algorithms and then study and compare
their performances under different adversary settings. We also demonstrate the impact of the
detection probability, the number of radios, the number of MUs, and adversary settings, on the
algorithm performance.
In the simulation setting, we consider K = 10 channels, and we deploy a monitor with l = 2
radios. We set the unit reward of successfully detecting on a single channel to be r = 0.3 and the
unit switching cost of tuning one radio to be c = 0.03. If not specified, the detection probability
of each radio is set to be pd = 0.9 as it is the recommended detection accuracy in consistent
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with [48]. The parameters of all algorithms are chosen as in the corollaries. If the monitor uses
SpecWatch-III, we set δ = 0.5 so that the weak regret is relatively small with an acceptable
confidence level.
We assume there are m = 2 MUs attacking channels either obliviously or adaptively. Specifi-
cally, we consider four adversary settings,
• Fixed adversary (Fixed): Each MU selects a fixed channel and never switches throughout
the time horizon T .
• Uniform adversary (Uniform): In every timeslot, each MU selects a channel uniformly at
random.
• Normal adversary (Normal): In every timeslot, each MU selects a channel following the
same normal distribution.
• Adaptive adversary (Adaptive): Each MU adopts modified SpecWatch-I, where the actual
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channel reward is r if the MU is not captured on that channel, and 0 otherwise.
The simulation results are shown below, and each of them is averaged over 100 trials.
Weak Regret. Fig. 2 shows the normalized weak regrets of all algorithms decrease with time
horizon T , which supports our theoretical analysis that the normalized weak regret converges
to 0 as T → ∞. In all following simulations, we fix the time horizon to be T = 50000. Here
we only show the result with adaptive adversary since in other adversary settings, the results
are similar. Note that SpecWatch-II outperforms other algorithms as shown in the figure, but it
only means that SpecWatch-II’s way to trade-off between exploration and exploitation is more
appropriate under our current simulation setting.
Fig. 3 plots how the normalized weak regret decreases with timeslots under adaptive adversary.
At the beginning, there is apparent fluctuation of the normalized weak regret. As time goes by,
the monitor and the adaptive adversary enter a relatively stable stage, but we can still see the
decreasing trend of the normalized weak regret, which indicates our algorithms are learning from
monitoring history to make smart decisions.
Impact of Algorithm Parameters. Among all parameters of the four algorithms, the most
important one is the batch size τ, which controls the trade-off between cumulative reward and
cumulative switching cost. As shown in Fig. 4, we conducted simulations where the batch size
τ was set to be exactly T1/∆ and plotted how the cumulative utility changes with ∆, under the
adaptive adversary. It is shown that all algorithms achieve highest cumulative utility ratio when
τ is around T1/3, which is in consistency with our theoretical analysis. The performances of all
algorithms are almost the same because they are designed based on the same framework and
using same way to trade-off between rewards and switching costs.
Cumulative Utility. Fig. 5 plots the actual utilities gained by SpecWatch-III. The figures for the
other three algorithms are very similar and thus omitted. We observe that the cumulative utilities
under fixed adversary greatly exceed the other three settings, and the other three settings have
similar results.
Impact of System Parameters and Adversary Settings. In simulations, we fix the time horizon
to be T = 50000. Since the impacts on all algorithms are similar, we only present results of
SpecWatch-III.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of detection probability pd on the cumulative rewards and the
cumulative switching cost.
As expected, the cumulative reward grows with decreasing slope as the detection probability
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increases. The cumulative switching cost, however, has a decreasing trend. This is because the
larger the detection probability, the more accurate for the monitor to evaluate each strategy;
thus the best strategy is revealed more quickly, avoiding unnecessary switches and reducing
cumulative switching cost.
We also study the impact the number of radios l, the number of MUs m, and the types of
adversary on the performance of our algorithms. Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Fig. 9 illustrate the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of expected number of timeslots to detect the first misuse. In general,
more radios or more MUs make it sooner for the monitor to detect successfully. In Fig. 9, the
monitor takes the longest time to detect the first misuse under fixed adversary setting, which is
because the monitor sticks to the same strategy for the whole batch to prevent switching costs.
If the monitor does not choose the channels attacked by MUs at the first timeslot in a batch, it
will not detect misuse for the following τ − 1 timeslots. As a result, it takes longer time for the
monitor to detect the first misuse under fixed adversary setting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the adversarial spectrum monitoring problem with unknown statistics
by formulating it as an adversarial multi-armed bandit problem with switching costs (MAB-SC).
To solve this problem, we proposed an online spectrum monitoring framework named SpecWatch
and designed two effective online algorithms, SpecWatch-II and SpecWatch-III. We rigorously
proved that their weak regrets are bounded by O(T2/3), which matches the lower bound of the
general MAB-SC problem. Thus, they are asymptotically optimal. Moreover, our algorithms
can guarantee the proved performance under any adversary setting and are independent of the
underlying misuse detection technique.
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